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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Criminal defendants are deprived of their Sixth 
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Amendment right to a jury selected from a broad representation 
of the community when distinctive groups are systematically 
excluded from the jury selection process. See Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979). Because any under-
representation in Joseph Howell’s jury pool was not caused by 
a systematically discriminatory process, the District Court 
properly denied his habeas petition alleging a Sixth 
Amendment violation. We will affirm.  
I. 
Jury selection in Howell’s 2004 prosecution consisted 
of two venire panels. The first included thirty-five individuals, 
two of whom were black but were both excused for hardship.  
The second panel included twenty-five potential jurors, all of 
whom were white. Ultimately, Howell, a black man, was 
convicted for the 2002 felony murder of a white man by an all-
white jury. 
Prior to jury selection, Howell filed a Motion to Ensure 
Representative Venire, arguing that he was entitled to a jury 
pool that represented a fair cross section of the community—
Allegheny County—particularly with respect to race. The trial 
court held a hearing on Howell’s allegations that black 
individuals were systemically under-represented in Allegheny 
County’s jury pools, during which it adopted the record from 
two other cases where defendants also raised a fair-cross-
section challenge. The incorporated record included expert 
testimony from Dr. John F. Karns, a sociologist, regarding the 
racial statistics and demography of Allegheny County. 
Dr. Karns’ testimony expounded on demographic data 
gathered over a six-month period in 2001, over a ten-day 
period in 2002, and from the 2000 census. The 2001 study was 
based on data gathered by the firm Gentile Meinert & 
Associates and interpreted by Dr. Karns. Gentile Meinert & 
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Associates provided prospective jurors (individuals who 
appeared for jury selection pursuant to a summons) with a 
paper survey that asked questions about their race, age, and 
gender. From this study, which surveyed approximately 4500 
potential jurors, Dr. Karns calculated that black individuals 
made up 4.87% of Allegheny County’s jury pool. He also 
found that black individuals made up 10.7% of the population 
of Allegheny County eligible for jury service. Based on these 
numbers, Dr. Karns concluded that “whites [were] 
overrepresented” in jury pools, resulting in systematic 
exclusion of “a significant number of people for a significant 
time.”  App. at 112, 127.  Despite this conclusion, the trial court 
denied Howell’s motion. 
An all-white jury was impaneled and found Howell 
guilty of felony murder. Howell moved for extraordinary 
relief, arguing that he should be retried by a representative jury, 
even if assembling the jury would require multiple venires. The 
trial court denied his motion; it then sentenced Howell to a 
mandatory sentence of life without parole. 
Howell timely appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court, which held that Howell had not been denied a trial by a 
fair cross-section of the community. The Superior Court noted 
Dr. Karns’ testimony,1 and identified the proper test for 
determining whether a fair-cross-section violation occurred. 
The court then concluded that Howell “fail[ed] to demonstrate 
‘an actual discriminatory practice in the jury selection 
process,’” and, therefore, held that Howell did not demonstrate 
a constitutional violation. App. at 252-54 (quoting 
                                              
1 The Superior Court observed Howell’s reliance on Dr. Karns’ 
testimony without stating whether it was reliable or making a 




Commonwealth v. Johnson, 838 A.2d 663, 682 (Pa. 2003)).  
The state court stated that, though the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
test does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, it was 
bound to follow Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, 
which does require such a showing. 
Howell filed a habeas petition based on six grounds, 
including his fair-cross-section claim. A magistrate judge 
issued a report and recommendation that assumed, without 
deciding, “that the Superior Court erred in requiring [Howell] 
to show discriminatory intent,” but concluded that, under de 
novo review, Howell failed to establish a Sixth Amendment 
violation. App. at 14-16. The magistrate judge compared the 
level of racial disparity in Howell’s case to those in other cases 
around the country. She concluded that, because other courts 
found no constitutional violation in cases with higher 
percentages of disparity than here, Howell could not establish 
his claim.  
The District Court adopted the magistrate judge’s report 
and recommendation and denied Howell’s petition. Howell 
now appeals. 
II. 
The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We exercise appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
The District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing 
but relied exclusively on the state court record; we therefore 
undertake a plenary review of the District Court’s order 
utilizing the same standard that the District Court applied.  
Branch v. Sweeney, 758 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2014). 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (“AEDPA”) dictates the parameters of our review and 
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requires us to afford considerable deference to the state court’s 
legal and factual determinations. Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 
F.3d 210, 234 (3d Cir. 2004). We may overturn a state-court 
holding only where it “resulted in a decision that was contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law,” or “was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.”  
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). The state court’s 
factual conclusions “‘shall be presumed to be correct’ unless 
the petitioner rebuts ‘the presumption of correctness by clear 
and convincing evidence.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(e)(1)).   
If the state court erred, habeas relief should be granted 
only if, upon de novo review, the prisoner has established that 
he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also 
Saranchak v. Beard, 616 F.3d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
The Sixth Amendment promises all criminal defendants 
a trial by a “jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of 
the community . . . as assurance of a diffused impartiality.”  
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (quoting 
Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting)). A violation of this right occurs where “jury 
wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries 
are drawn . . . exclude distinctive groups in the community.”  
Duren, 439 U.S. at 363-64 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538). 
Howell argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated 
by Allegheny County’s systematic exclusion of black jurors at 
the time of his trial. 
A. 
A state-court decision is “contrary to” or an 
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“unreasonable application of” federal law if it directly conflicts 
with Supreme Court precedent or reaches a different result than 
the Supreme Court when presented with materially 
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 
(2000). 
In its analysis, the state court relied on its interpretation 
of Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent to determine 
whether Howell established a prima facie violation of his right 
to a jury composed of a representative cross-section of his 
community. Quoting Commonwealth v. Estes, 851 A.2d 933 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (citing Johnson, 838 A.2d 663), the court 
set forth the Duren standard for establishing such a violation—
that (1) an allegedly excluded group is “distinctive” in the 
community; (2) the group’s representation in jury-selection 
panels is not fair and reasonable in relation to the community’s 
population; and (3) the group is under-represented due to its 
systematic exclusion from the jury-selection process—but then 
went on to state that “[p]roof is required of an actual 
discriminatory practice in the jury selection process, not 
merely underrepresentation of one particular group.” App. at 
252-54. The state court acknowledged Howell’s argument that 
he was “not required to prove discriminatory intent . . . under 
Duren,” but the court concluded that “the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has held otherwise” and that it was “bound by 
[that] prior decision[].” App. at 253-54. 
Irrespective of how the Superior Court reached its 
conclusion, that conclusion must comport with “clearly 
established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (“As the statutory language makes 
clear . . . § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established 
Federal law to [the Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.”).  
Therefore, the question before us is whether the Superior 
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Court’s decision is consistent with Duren and its progeny. 
Duren established a three-factor test for determining 
when a fair-cross-section violation has occurred. Significantly, 
that test does not include a requirement for proof of 
discriminatory intent. To the contrary, the Court—in a 
footnote—distinguished the Sixth Amendment claim before it 
from cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause by 
noting that, in the latter, a showing of discriminatory purpose 
is essential, but that, in the former, “systematic disproportion 
itself demonstrates an infringement.” Duren, 439 U.S.  at 368 
n.26.  
The Commonwealth correctly notes that the Court’s 
statements in a footnote are not necessarily binding authority 
on habeas review because “‘clearly established Federal law’ . . 
. includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the] 
Court’s decisions.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 
(2015) (citing White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014)).  
However, Footnote 26 is not the only place in Duren where the 
Court makes clear that a showing of discriminatory intent is 
not required.  In the body of the opinion, the Court enumerated 
the three elements that a prisoner must establish to prove a 
constitutional violation, thereby setting the outer parameters of 
a fair-cross-section analysis, and it simply did not include 
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discriminatory intent as one of those elements.2 Therefore, 
requiring a prisoner to show discriminatory intent imposes a 
more stringent standard than the one articulated by the 
Supreme Court. Though states may provide broader 
constitutional protections than required by federal law, they 
“may not impose . . . greater restrictions as a matter of federal 
constitutional law when [the Supreme] Court specifically 
refrains from imposing them.” Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 
719 (1975) (emphasis omitted)). 
The state court did not address the three factors 
identified in the Duren test, but instead rested its decision 
exclusively on Howell’s failure to identify a discriminatory 
purpose. By requiring proof of this additional element, the 
Superior Court imposed greater restrictions on Howell than 
those required by the Supreme Court, contrary to and in an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 
B. 
Because the Superior Court’s decision contradicts 
federal law, this Court must review Howell’s claim de novo.  
To establish a fair-cross-section violation, Howell must prove 
that, at the time of his trial, (1) blacks were a “‘distinctive’ 
group in the community”; (2) “representation of [blacks] in 
                                              
2 Writing in dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority 
for imposing the very distinction between Equal Protection 
Clause cases and Sixth Amendment cases that the Superior 
Court ignores. Duren, 439 U.S. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing that “[t]he difference [between equal 
protection and Sixth Amendment cases] apparently lies in the 
fact, among others, that under equal protection analysis prima 
facie challenges are rebuttable by proof of absence of intent to 




venires from which juries [were] selected [was] not fair and 
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community”; and (3) “this underrepresentation [was] due to 
systematic exclusion of [blacks] in the jury selection process.” 
Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. 
1. Distinctive Group 
Blacks are “unquestionably a constitutionally cognizable 
group.” Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(en banc).  See also United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 239 
(3d Cir. 2001) (finding that blacks are “sufficiently numerous 
and distinct from others in the population” to satisfy the first 
prong of the Duren test (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482, 495 (1977))). 
2. Unfair and Unreasonable Representation 
Howell’s claim that blacks were unfairly and 
unreasonably represented in jury venires “must be supported 
by statistical evidence,” beginning with the percentage of 
blacks in the community at the time of his trial. Weaver, 267 
F.3d at 240 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). Relying on the 
2000 Census, Howell has demonstrated that 10.7% of the adult 
population in Allegheny County identified as black. See 
Duren, 439 U.S. at 365 (accepting census data as “prima facie 
evidence of population characteristics”). This population 
percentage must then be compared to the percentage of blacks 
included in the jury venire to determine whether representation 
was proportionately fair and reasonable. Id. at 364-67. 
i. Reliability of the Data 
Howell relies on the 2001 study conducted by Gentile 
Meinert & Associates for his claim that blacks made up 4.87% 
of jury pools. However, there is no evidence regarding how 
many people received jury summonses, how many people 
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appeared for jury selection (versus the number of individuals 
who received surveys), or how many people failed to fill out 
the survey. Without this information, Howell’s statistical data 
is not sufficiently reliable to support a finding of unfair and 
unreasonable representation.3 See Weaver, 267 F.3d at 243-44.   
In Weaver, this Court found that a prisoner’s figures 
were too weak to support his claims where the statistician 
based his conclusions only on completed and returned 
questionnaires without accounting for unanswered 
questionnaires. Id. The Court highlighted that, to support an 
allegation of under-representation, the statistician was required 
to perform one of three analyses: (1) analyze the race of every 
person in the jury pool; (2) perform a sampling of the jury pool 
                                              
3 Under AEDPA, the state court’s implicit and explicit factual 
findings are presumed correct “if supported by the record.” 
Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 433 (3d Cir. 2007); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Even if the Superior Court had implicitly 
made a credibility determination regarding Dr. Karns’ 
testimony—which it did not, compare Campbell v. Vaughn, 
209 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding implicit credibility 
determination where Superior Court relied on the contested 
testimony to conclude that defendant did not demonstrate 
ineffective assistance of counsel), with App. at 252 (noting that 
Howell “relies on the testimony of John F. Karns, Ph.D.,” but 
then reaching its legal determination without any reference to 
or reliance upon Dr. Karns’ testimony)—that determination 
would be undermined by the record for the reasons we explain. 
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and then calculate the standard deviation4; or (3) account for 
the statistical impact of the unreturned questionnaires. Id. at 
244. Because he did not provide any of these analyses, this 
Court concluded that the statistical evidence was “too weak to 
support a finding of representation that is unfair and 
unreasonable.”5 Id. 
Howell’s statistical data suffers from the same 
weaknesses we identified in Weaver. As in Weaver, Dr. Karns 
                                              
4 “Standard deviation” is often confused with the similar, but 
distinct, calculation of “standard error.” See Douglas G. 
Altman & J. Martin Bland, Statistics Note, Standard Deviation 
and Standard Errors, 331 Brit. Med. J. 903 (2005). As called 
for in Weaver, reliable data requires a standard deviation 
calculation if the entire population is not accounted for, which 
“indicates how accurately the mean represents sample data.”  
Dong Kyu Lee et al., Standard Deviation and Standard Error 
of the Mean, 68 Korean J. Anesthesiology 220 (2015); see also 
Weaver, 267 F.3d at 238 n.6 (requiring calculation of the 
standard deviation “because it establishes the probability that a 
sample taken from the jury wheel accurately reflects the 
composition of the entire wheel”). 
5 The Court also noted that discrepancies in the statistician’s 
testimony, wherein he consistently claimed to have examined 
the entire master wheel even though he did not account for 
unreturned surveys, “further undermine[d] the strength of the 
evidence.” Weaver, 267 F.3d at 243-44. 
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did not analyze the racial makeup of the entire jury venire.6  
Though approximately 4500 individuals were given surveys 
over a six-month period, Dr. Karns’ analysis did not take the 
unanswered surveys into consideration, which significantly 
weakens the reliability and influence of the statistical data. Id. 
at 244. As Dr. Karns acknowledged, if a higher percentage of 
blacks failed to answer the survey than whites, the results of 
the survey would be “skewed.” App. at 131. However, Dr. 
Karns does not know how many surveys omitted responses to 
certain questions or went unanswered entirely, let alone the 
race of the individuals who chose not to answer them. Because 
of this missing data, it is not possible to now calculate the 
standard deviation or account for the significance of 
unanswered surveys, as we require. 
Howell claims that Dr. Karns’ data does satisfy Weaver 
because he conducted a validity analysis known as the “Z-
statistic,” which Howell claims is “akin to standard deviation,” 
and concluded that the chances of his conclusion that blacks 
were under-represented being incorrect “are about four in 
10,000.” Reply Br. at 13 (quoting App. at 112). However, the 
purpose of the “Z-statistic” is simply to determine the “risk of 
being wrong” about a hypothesis. App. at 112. Here, Dr. 
Karns’ starting hypothesis was “that there are too few African-
Americans” in jury pools. Id. However, Dr. Karns did not 
                                              
6 In addition to acknowledging that he had “no idea” whether 
every potential juror filled out the survey, App. at 117—and it 
would be illogical to believe that each person did—Dr. Karns 
also testified that jurors who were originally assembled in civil 
court assignment rooms but were later brought to criminal 
court were not surveyed. Therefore, we can conclude without 
speculation that Dr. Karns’ analysis failed to account for every 
member of the venire. 
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provide any analysis to explain how a low likelihood of this 
hypothesis being incorrect sufficiently demonstrates that his 
statistical representations are reliable, particularly in light of 
the unaccounted for, unanswered surveys. For instance, it 
could certainly be true that blacks appear on jury pools less 
often than we would statistically expect, but that the degree of 
under-representation does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation. Dr. Karns’ Z-statistic analysis 
regarding the accuracy of his general hypothesis cannot 
substitute a standard deviation calculation, which is an inquiry 
into the reliability of the statistics he presented and is required 
by our precedent. 
Because Howell’s statistical data fails to account for the 
entire jury venire using one of the statistical methodologies 
approved by this Court, it is “too weak to support a finding of 
representation that is unfair and unreasonable.” Weaver, 267 
F.3d at 244. 
ii. Significance of the Data 
Even if Howell had provided reliable data, courts 
around the nation, including our own, have found that 
representation was not unfair or unreasonable with disparity 
levels greater than or similar to those presented here.   
To determine the significance of the statistical evidence, 
we must compare the population percentage (10.7%) with the 
jury venire percentage (4.87%). This Court has relied on two 
methods of statistical analysis to determine the significance of 
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the disparity between the percentages: absolute disparity7 and 
comparative disparity.8 Weaver, 267 F.3d at 241; Ramseur, 
983 F.2d at 1233-35.   
The absolute disparity in this case, 5.83%, is lower than 
or similar to absolute disparities in other cases where courts 
have found no constitutional violation, and in fact, numerous 
courts have noted that an absolute disparity below 10% 
generally will not reflect unfair and unreasonable 
representation. See United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 
1273 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that courts of appeals “generally 
are reluctant to find [unfair and unreasonable representation] 
when the absolute disparities are less than 10%”); see also, 
                                              
7 Absolute disparity reflects the difference in the percentage of, 
in this case, blacks in the general voting-age population and in 
the jury venire: 10.7% (population percentage) - 4.87% (venire 
percentage) = 5.83% (absolute disparity). This absolute 
disparity reflects that, in a jury pool of one hundred people, 
approximately six fewer black people would be in the pool than 
statistically expected. 
8 Comparative disparity “measures the decreased likelihood 
that members of an underrepresented group will be called for 
jury service” relative to what would be expected given the 
percentage of the general population that group comprises. 
United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(emphasis in original) (cited by Weaver, 267 F.3d at 241-42). 
This is calculated by dividing the absolute disparity by the 
population percentage: 5.83% (absolute disparity) ÷ 10.7% 
(population percentage) = 54.49% (comparative disparity). 
This comparative disparity reflects that, at the time of Howell’s 
trial, blacks were 54.49% less likely to be on venires than if the 
representation was directly proportional to their population in 
the County.  
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e.g., Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1998) (5% 
absolute disparity insufficient even though no blacks were on 
jury panel); United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1402-03 
(10th Cir. 1998) (3.19%, 5.74%, and 7.0% absolute disparities 
insufficient); United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 
1994) (3.4% absolute disparity insufficient); Ramseur, 983 
F.2d at 1232 (absolute disparity of 14.1% “borderline”); 
United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(2.8%, 4.7%, and 7.7.% absolute disparities insufficient).  
Likewise, courts have found that comparative 
disparities similar to the comparative disparity in this case, 
54.49%, were insufficient to demonstrate unfair and 
unreasonable representation. See, e.g., United States v. 
Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding 
comparative disparity of 40.89% insufficient where the 
distinctive group represented 7.9% of the population); United 
States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155-56 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(finding comparative disparity of 46% insufficient where the 
group represented 15.6% of the population). But see LaRoche 
v. Perrin, 718 F.2d 500, 502-03 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that a 
prima facie challenge was established where the comparative 
disparity was 68.22% and the group comprised 38.4% of the 
population), overruled on other grounds by Barber v. Ponte, 
772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985). 
When compared to factually similar cases, the absolute 
and comparative disparities reflected in this case do not make 
a prima facie showing of unconstitutional under-
representation.  
3. Systematic Exclusion 
If Howell’s claims were supported by reliable statistical 
evidence, to prove a cross-section violation, Howell would 
need to show that the under-representation of blacks in jury 
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pools is “due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection 
process.” Weaver, 267 F.3d at 244 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 
366). In Duren, the Supreme Court found systematic exclusion 
where a state law permitted women to exclude themselves from 
jury selection simply because of their gender. 439 U.S. at 367. 
Unlike in Duren, where the system that caused the under-
representation—a state statute—was readily apparent, there is 
no identifiable cause for the under-representation of blacks in 
jury venires in Allegheny County. Therefore, to demonstrate 
“systematic exclusion,” Howell must show “a large 
discrepancy over time such that the system must be said to 
bring about the underrepresentation.” Weaver, 267 F.3d at 244. 
We consider the nature of the system, length of time studied, 
and “efforts at reform to increase the representativeness of jury 
lists” in determining whether the jury selection system caused 
the under-representation.  Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1234-35. 
i. Nature of the System 
A selection process that is facially neutral is unlikely to 
demonstrate systematic exclusion. See Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 
1235. In Ramseur, we concluded that the selection process was 
facially neutral because the pool of jurors (the “Master List”) 
was composed of names from both the voter registration and 
Department of Motor Vehicles lists, and, therefore, did not 
preference any particular age, gender, or race. Id. Likewise, at 
the time of Howell’s trial, the Master List consisted of names 
from Allegheny County’s list of registered voters and the 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s driving records. 
Howell does not contest the propriety of Allegheny County’s 
method for compiling its Master List, and these parallels 




ii. Length of Time Studied 
Even assuming that Howell’s data was based on a 
reliable study, that study must have demonstrated ongoing 
discrimination over a sufficient period of time. In Ramseur, 
this Court held that a study conducted over the course of two 
years was not sufficient to show a history of abuse that would 
reflect a systematic exclusion. 983 F.2d at 1235. Howell seeks 
to distinguish the six-month study in this case from Ramseur 
by noting that, in Duren¸ the underlying study lasted for only 
eight months.9 
Howell cannot distinguish his case from Ramseur by 
relying on the eight-month study in Duren because the 
problematic system there—a gender-based exemption 
statute—was readily identifiable and undisputed. Duren, 439 
U.S. at 367. Additionally, unlike here, where the data reflects 
an amalgamation of the racial makeup of jury pools over the 
six-month period, Duren undisputedly demonstrated “that a 
large discrepancy occurred not just occasionally but in every 
weekly venire for a period of nearly a year.” Id. at 366. The 
Supreme Court emphasized that this repeated, perpetual under-
representation “manifestly indicate[d] that the cause of the 
under-representation was systematic.” Id. Howell’s evidence is 
not similarly specific and does not support a conclusion that 
the under-representation was occurring in every, or even nearly 
                                              
9 On appeal, Howell also points to media reports and studies 
regarding racial under-representation that began in 2002; 
however, these studies were not part of the record before the 
state court, and we cannot consider them. See S.H. ex rel. 
Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 267 n.27 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (refusing to consider evidence offered for the first 
time on appeal). 
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every venire for a substantial period of time.   
iii. Efforts to Reform 
Where the government is engaged in on-going efforts to 
improve the representativeness of jury lists, it is less likely that 
the data reflects that under-representation is due to a systematic 
exclusion in the jury process. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1235. We 
presume that the process is legitimate where the government’s 
efforts seem likely to create a representative jury, even if the 
statistical evidence demonstrates that the pool is “not 
representative enough.” Id. 
At the time of Howell’s trial, Allegheny County was 
unable to say whether there was a representation problem with 
its Master List because its records did not reflect the races of 
potential jurors. Around 2002, to remedy the risk of under-
representation, the Court Administration Office revised its 
eligibility questionnaire to include questions regarding race, 
age, and gender so that it could better understand whether a 
particular group was over-represented or under-represented. 
Allegheny County additionally implemented procedures to 
follow up on unreturned questionnaires, ensure that the Master 
List reflects up-to-date addresses, and encourage individuals to 
respond to jury summonses. According to the Court 
Administration Office, each of these actions was implemented 
to better ensure proportionate representation. These laudable 
remedial actions warrant “some presumption of [the jury 
system’s] legitimacy,” Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1235, and reflect 
that Allegheny County’s processes were not systematically 
exclusive. 
IV. 
Though the Pennsylvania Superior Court misapplied the 
Supreme Court’s precedent in denying Howell’s Sixth 
Amendment claim, on de novo review, we find that Howell 
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failed to show that Allegheny County’s jury selection 
processes systematically excluded black jurors. We will 




PORTER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I join the majority in holding that Joseph Howell failed 
to satisfy the second and third requirements of Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). But I reach that conclusion 
slightly differently. On Duren’s second prong, I would avoid 
the soundness-of-the-statistics debate for a simple reason: even 
assuming arguendo that Howell’s statistics are 
methodologically sound, the disparity figures are within the 
range that we have held constitutionally permissible. So I 
would hold that Howell fails Duren’s second requirement on 
that basis. On Duren’s third requirement, I agree with the 
majority’s analysis. But I supplement it to underscore that 
Allegheny County’s jury-selection system goes above and 
beyond what is constitutionally required, so there cannot be 
systematic exclusion. 
To satisfy Duren’s second requirement, a defendant 
must show that “the representation of [an underrepresented 
distinctive] group in jury venires is not ‘fair and reasonable’ in 
relation to the number of such persons in the community.” 
United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). As the majority observes, two 
statistical measurements drive this analysis: absolute disparity 
and comparative disparity. We consider both of these disparity 
measures, which makes us something of an outlier. See Nancy 
Gertner, et al., The Law of Juries § 2.11 (10th ed. 2018) (noting 
that while “[t]he Supreme Court has not mandated the use of 
one approach over another,” in practice, “[m]ost [courts] have 
rejected comparative disparity analysis”). 
Howell’s statistics show an absolute disparity of 5.83%, 
which is easily within the range typically found 




summarizes, “[m]any courts have adopted a threshold of 10% 
absolute disparity.” Gertner, § 2.12. We have followed this 
trend, marking the threshold a smidge higher. See Ramseur v. 
Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1232 & n.18 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Courts 
addressing the question of whether a given absolute disparity 
constitutes ‘substantial underrepresentation’ have held that 
absolute disparities between 2.0% and 11.5% do not constitute 
substantial underrepresentation.” (quoting Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977))). So the absolute disparity 
of 5.8% in this case is constitutionally permissible under 
authorities from this and other courts. 
This means that Howell must rely on comparative 
disparity to satisfy Duren’s second prong. This is a much closer 
question. Under our precedents, the comparative disparity of 
54.5% shown here is troubling. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1232 
(describing “a comparative disparity of about 40%” as 
“borderline” but ultimately rejecting prima facie case); see also 
Weaver, 267 F.3d at 243 (describing comparative disparity 
figures of 40.01% for blacks and 72.98% for Hispanics as 
“quite high,” but qualified that the figures were of limited value 
because both groups formed “a small percentage of the 
population”). But we have never held that a high comparative 
disparity is itself sufficient to satisfy Duren’s second prong. 
And indeed, other courts have rejected fair-cross-section 
challenges involving comparative disparities higher than (or 
similar to) the one here.1 So the comparative-disparity figure 
                                              
1 See, e.g., United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (permitting comparative disparities of “48%, 50%, 
and almost 60%”); United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 
1237, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000) (permitting “a comparative 




in this case—while high—is not enough to satisfy Duren’s 
second prong. 
Turning to Duren’s third requirement, Howell must 
show “the underrepresentation is caused by the ‘systematic 
exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.’” Weaver, 
267 F.3d at 237 (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). On this 
point, I am puzzled by the dissent’s insistence that the County’s 
system is constitutionally deficient. 
The County’s two-track method of selecting jurors is 
structurally sound. It first draws names from voter-registration 
lists. It then supplements this by pulling additional names from 
motor-vehicle records. If anything, the County’s system goes 
above and beyond what is required, as courts have consistently 
held that using voter-registration lists alone is sufficient.2 “Not 
                                              
879 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging a comparative 
disparity of 58.3%, but declining to address statistics at all to 
“simply hold that when jury pools are selected from voter 
registration lists, statistics alone cannot prove a Sixth 
Amendment violation”); Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23–24 (permitting 
comparative disparity of 54.2%); United States v. Sanchez-
Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 548–49 (9th Cir. 1989) (permitting 
comparative disparity of 52.9%); United States v. Orange, 447 
F.3d 792, 798–99 (10th Cir. 2006) (permitting comparative 
disparity of 51.22%). 
 
2 United States v. Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245, 1247–49 (2d Cir. 
1972) (approving the use of voter-registration lists as the sole 
source of names for jury selection); United States v. Odeneal, 
517 F.3d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 2008) (approving jury 
administrator’s use of voter-registration lists, noting these “are 




only has the use of the voter registration lists been uniformly 
approved by the Court[s] of Appeals as the basic source for the 
jury selection process … Congress specifically approved the 
use of such lists even though it was recognized that persons 
who chose not to register would be excluded from the jury 
selection process.” United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1448 
(4th Cir. 1988) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2)). In fact, the 
County’s two-track system here is strikingly similar to the one 
we upheld in Ramseur. 983 F.2d at 1233 (noting that the 
“mechanism used to create the source lists was facially neutral 
with respect to race,” as the New Jersey county in question 
“utilized voter registration and Department of Motor Vehicle 
lists to create its jury venire”).  
Unsurprisingly, then, the dissent cites no case in which 
a hybrid system like this one—i.e., voter-registration lists 
supplemented with motor-vehicle records—has been held to 
systematically exclude a distinctive group. In dicta, we have 
speculated “that if the use of voter registration lists over time 
did have the effect of sizeably underrepresenting a particular 
class or group on the jury venire, then under some 
circumstances, this could constitute a violation of a defendant’s 
fair cross-section rights under” the Sixth Amendment. Weaver, 
267 F.3d at 244–45 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). But that theoretical possibility was not the reality in 
Weaver, as “nothing in the record” showed persistent 
systematic exclusion of minority jurors. Id. at 245. And 
                                              
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)); United States v. Greatwalker, 356 F.3d 
908, 911 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding no systematic exclusion from 
jury selection plan that draws its pools of prospective jurors 





whatever the merits of that theoretical possibility, we have 
never invoked it to hold that a hybrid system like this one 
systematically excluded a distinctive group. Given that 
Congress has made voter-registration lists the presumptive 
source for selecting jurors, such a holding could imperil juror-
selection methods across many jurisdictions. 
In support of systematic exclusion, Howell argues that 
the County’s problems with “non-representative jury venires 
were widely known well before” Howell’s trial, largely 
because the County and some academics studied it. Appellant’s 
Br. 36–39. This is weak tea. The fact that the County studied 
this issue does not show that the County knew its selection 
system was constitutionally unsound; rather, it may simply 
show that the County was responsibly trying to determine the 
system’s soundness or seeking to improve (already 
constitutionally sufficient) representation. In Ramseur, we 
viewed a New Jersey county’s efforts to diversify jury venires 
just this way, approvingly noting the county’s “efforts at 
reform to increase the representativeness of jury lists.” 983 
F.2d at 1235. Howell’s inferences, by contrast, would 
perversely punish the County for its salutary reform efforts.  
In sum, if the County used only voter-registration lists 
to assemble the jury venire, it would be employing a method 
widely upheld as constitutional by the courts of appeals and 
statutorily prescribed by the Jury Selection and Service Act. 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1861–78. By supplementing this method with 
motor-vehicle records, the County goes beyond this widely 
approved method to mirror the system upheld in Ramseur. 
Howell has not suggested how the County could improve upon 





RESTREPO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I join the majority opinion only with respect to Part 
III.A, in which the majority holds that we are not required to 
accord deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) to the legal conclusions of the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court because that court’s decision was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law.  I respectfully dissent from the 
remainder of the majority opinion because, in my view, Howell 
has established a prima facie violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to have his petit jury drawn from a fair cross-section of 
the community, and I would reach the merits of his fair-cross-
section claim because the Commonwealth has presented no 
evidence to rebut Howell’s statistical analysis or the 
qualifications of his expert witness.  The majority, however, 
lends undue credence to the Commonwealth’s speculative 
attack on the reliability of Howell’s statistics and, in the 
process, sets forth a new standard of statistical purity that will 
foreclose nearly all fair-cross-section claims.  And with respect 
to the merits of Howell’s fair-cross-section claim, the majority 
and concurring opinions interpret the case law in a way that 
deprives the Sixth Amendment of any power to provide a 
remedy in cases where a distinctive group that constitutes less 
than 10% (or, for the concurrence, 11.5%) of the population is 
systematically excluded from serving on venires, even if the 
entire group is completely excluded from venire service.  Such 
an interpretation simply cannot be an accurate statement of the 





Howell presented evidence that black persons 
constituted 10.7% of the jury-service-eligible population of 
Allegheny County in the early 2000s but merely 4.87% of 
persons serving on venires during the same period.  Thus, 
according to Howell’s evidence, black persons in Allegheny 
County were underrepresented on venires by approximately 
54.49%.  Put another way, it appears that over half of 
Allegheny County’s black jury-service-eligible population—a 
significant population of nearly 110,000 people—was 
excluded from serving on venires. 
 Rather than discussing these troubling statistics at 
length, the majority simply attacks their reliability.  In so 
doing, the majority misapplies our precedent in United States 
v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2001), and, as a result, sets a 
new bar for statistical reliability that almost no litigant in a fair-
cross-section case will be able to satisfy.1 
                                              
1  Independently, the Court also may lack authority 
under AEDPA to probe into the reliability of Howell’s 
statistics in the first place.  Pursuant to AEDPA, in a section 
2254 proceeding such as this one, “a determination of a factual 
issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).  Both implicit and explicit factual 
findings are presumed to be correct under section 2254(e)(1).  
Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 433 (3d Cir. 2007).  Two of the 
three judges on the panel of the Superior Court appear to have 
reached their decisions by taking Howell’s statistical evidence 
at face value, which, in my opinion, may constitute an implicit 
factual finding that is entitled to the “presumption of 




 The majority reads Weaver as requiring all litigants 
asserting fair-cross-section claims to either (1) produce 
documentary evidence that they conducted a complete census 
of the races of every single individual in the relevant jury pool 
(e.g., every person on the “master wheel” or venire), or (2) 
perform sampling of the jury pool “and then calculate the 
standard deviation,” or (3) “account for the statistical impact” 
of persons in the jury pool who were not surveyed or studied.  
267 F.3d at 244.  This reading of Weaver disregards the 
specific context of that case.  In Weaver, the demographer who 
provided expert testimony regarding the racial makeup of the 
“master wheel” in the Erie Division of the Western District of 
Pennsylvania purported to have studied all persons on the 
“master wheel,” on which 5,877 persons were listed.  See id. at 
243.  Our Court determined, however, that the demographer 
“based his testimony on the returned questionnaires,” of which 
there were only 4,753.  Id.  Thus, in Weaver, concrete 
evidence—figures that demonstrated with specificity that 
1,124 persons, or over 19%, of the relevant jury pool were not 
included in the study—effectively impeached the 
demographer’s testimony that he had studied all persons in the 
jury pool.  Consequently, because the demographer did not—
either quantitatively or qualitatively—account for the glaring 
discrepancy in his testimony, our confidence in the reliability 
of his statistics was undermined. 
 Placed in context, Weaver stands for the proposition that 
“the strength of [a litigant’s statistical] evidence” is 
“undermined” when (1) the state produces concrete evidence 
that the petitioner’s expert did not study all persons in the 
relevant jury pool and (2) the expert neither (A) “perform[ed] 




deviation” nor (B) “account[ed] for the statistical impact of” 
unstudied or uncounted persons in the jury pool.  Id. at 244. 
 Here, there is no such concrete evidence that Howell’s 
expert failed to study all persons on the venires during the six-
month study period—there is only speculation.  Despite its 
failure to substantively challenge the reliability of Howell’s 
statistics or the qualifications of Howell’s expert in any of the 
state-court proceedings below, the Commonwealth, in its brief, 
now argues that the Court should disregard Howell’s statistical 
evidence solely because his expert, Dr. John F. Karns, Ph.D., 
“did not know if every individual [in the studied venires] 
complied with the request to fill out the questionnaire[s].”  
Appellee’s Br. 15.  The Commonwealth presents no evidence 
regarding the number of veniremembers who allegedly did not 
return the questionnaires; it merely speculates that there could 
have been veniremembers who did not return the 
questionnaires. 
 For the majority, mere speculation of this nature is 
sufficient to defeat Howell’s Sixth Amendment fair-cross-
section claim.  This holding—that the state can defeat a fair-
cross-section claim simply by speculating, with no evidentiary 
support, that a habeas petitioner’s statistics may be flawed—
transforms the modest holding in Weaver regarding statistical 
reliability into a holding that dramatically heightens the burden 
of proof in fair-cross-section cases.  In effect, the majority 
holds that, to state a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section 
claim, a litigant must produce unassailable proof that she 
conducted a complete census of every single member of the 
relevant jury pool; if the state simply speculates that certain 
members of the jury pool may have been excluded from the 




effect, the litigant’s fair-cross-section claim fails unless certain 
limited conditions are met. 
 The majority also takes a severely constrained view 
with respect to what evidence can satisfy such limited 
conditions and requires Howell to produce evidence that is 
wholly irrelevant to its inquiry into the reliability of his 
statistics.  Relying on its reading of Weaver, the majority holds 
that because Howell’s statistical analysis is fundamentally 
undermined by the Commonwealth’s speculation regarding the 
potential existence of unstudied veniremembers,2 Howell’s 
claim may only survive if he either (1) “calculate[s] the 
standard deviation” or (2) “account[s] for the statistical impact 
of . . . unreturned questionnaires.”  Howell has produced 
evidence that satisfies both of these conditions, even assuming 
that both conditions are relevant.  Regarding the “significance 
of unanswered surveys,” the only concrete evidence in the 
record that indicates that certain veniremembers were omitted 
                                              
2  As an ancillary matter, the majority also holds 
that Howell’s statistical evidence is undermined by the fact that 
“there is no evidence regarding how many people received jury 
summonses.”  It is unclear how information with respect to 
“how many people received jury summonses” is relevant to 
Howell’s claim because his claim is based on the composition 
of the venires—the persons who actually appeared for jury 
service—in Allegheny County, a type of claim that has long 
been recognized as cognizable by the Supreme Court.  See, 
e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (“[T]he 
jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which 
juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive 
groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably 




from the study is that “a very small number” of “surveys 
contain[ed] incomplete information.”  App. 118.  Dr. Karns 
explicitly testified as to the statistical impact of these 
incomplete surveys on his results:  the number of such surveys 
was “so small that it [did] not change [his] opinion.”  Id. at 128.  
Thus, Howell has accounted for the only concrete evidence in 
the record that his statistical analysis may be based on less than 
complete information, and, therefore, Howell has satisfied one 
of the majority’s requirements. 
Regarding the majority’s requirement that Howell 
calculate the standard deviation, it is not clear to me how 
calculation of the standard deviation relates to the question that 
the majority seeks to answer:  How do (potentially) 
unaccounted-for veniremembers affect the reliability of 
Howell’s statistical analysis?  “[S]tandard deviation is a 
measure of [the] variability . . . of the population from which 
[a] sample was drawn.”3  In other words, standard deviation is 
an expression of “how widely scattered some measurements 
[of a population] are.”4  For example, students who score a 141 
on the LSAT have scores that are one standard deviation from 
                                              
3  Douglas G. Altman & J. Martin Bland, Statistics 
Note, Standard Deviations and Standard Errors, 331 Brit. 
Med. J. 903 (2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC1255808/pdf/bmj33100903.pdf (emphasis 
added). 




the mean score of 151.5  But the fact that one standard deviation 
is equivalent to approximately 10 points in the context of the 
distribution of LSAT scores tells us nothing about the 
statistical reliability of the analysis conducted by the Law 
School Admission Council—it only tells us how the scores are 
distributed on a curve.  It appears to me that the majority 
actually desires a calculation of the “standard error,” which 
“indicates the uncertainty around the estimate of the mean” due 
to, among other things, sampling errors.6  “The terms ‘standard 
error’ and ‘standard deviation’ are often confused.”7  The 
former concept, standard error, concerns the reliability of 
Howell’s statistics, which statistics indicate that over the 
course of the study period, a mean of 4.87 black persons served 
on every venire of 100 persons; standard error would tell us 
how confident we should be that the mean of 4.87 is an 
accurate figure.  In requiring that Howell instead calculate the 
standard deviation, the majority perpetuates an error of 
terminology first committed by our Court in Weaver.  See 267 
F.3d at 244 (“In order to support Weaver’s allegation of 
underrepresentation on the master wheel, [his expert] would 
have had to . . . calculate the standard deviation . . . .”).  Thus, 
                                              
5  See Memorandum from Lisa Anthony, Senior 
Research Assoc., Law Sch. Admission Council, to LSAT 




6  Altman & Bland, supra note 3. 




the majority requires Howell to produce evidence that is not at 
all relevant to probing the reliability of his statistics.8 
                                              
8  If, however, the majority truly desires a 
calculation of the standard deviation—which is irrelevant for 
the reasons stated above—Howell has produced equivalent 
statistical evidence.   Dr. Karns used a “difference-of-
proportion test” by calculating a “Z-statistic,” App. 112, and 
then calculating what social scientists refer to as a “P value,” 
which is a “statistical summary of the compatibility between 
the observed data and what we would predict or expect to see 
if we knew the entire statistical model.”  Sander Greenland et 
al., Statistics Tests, P Values, Confidence Intervals, and 
Power:  A Guide to Misinterpretations, 31 Eur. J. 
Epidemiology 337, 339 (2016).  Put differently, a P value “can 
be viewed as a continuous measure of the compatibility 
between the data and the entire model used to compute it, 
ranging from 0 for complete incompatibility to 1 for perfect 
compatibility.”  Id.  Similar to the way that standard deviation 
indicates the variance within a population, a P value indicates 
the variance between observed data and the data that we would 
expect to observe.  Here, for instance, we would expect that the 
percentage of black persons serving on venires in Allegheny 
County would mirror the black jury-service-eligible population 
of Allegheny County as a whole (10.7%).  As Dr. Karns 
observed, however, black persons constituted merely 4.87% of 
persons serving on venires.  That observed data (4.87%) varies 
widely from the expected data (10.7%), resulting in a P value 
of .0004 according to Dr. Karns, which closely nears complete 
incompatibility.  See App. 112 (characterizing the “chances of 
being wrong in stating that there are too few African[ 




Further, standing alone, the sample size of the study 
upon which Howell relies indicates that Howell’s statistics are 
reliable.  Approximately 4,500 persons were surveyed in 
connection with the study.  Unrebutted expert testimony in this 
case establishes that a “sample of 4[,]500 is relatively large.”  
App. 119.  Because the sample in this case was so large, the 
standard error necessarily is small because “[t]he standard 
error falls as the sample size increases, as the extent of 
variation is reduced.”9  By questioning the reliability of the 
statistics resulting from such a large sample size and by 
emphasizing the alleged importance of surveying every single 
member of venires without exception, the majority undermines 
the very concept of sampling in Sixth Amendment challenges. 
In sum, the majority opinion sets forth a new standard 
of statistical purity that appears to be unattainable for nearly all 
litigants—and particularly for habeas petitioners—in fair-
cross-section cases.  Litigants are required to present statistical 
evidence to support fair-cross-section claims.  See Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).  If the state can 
fundamentally undermine a litigant’s statistical analysis with 
mere speculation that her statistics are unreliable, nearly all 
                                              
characterize P values in terms of “the probability that chance 
alone produced the observed association.”  Greenland et al., 
supra, at 340.  Thus, if the majority desires statistical evidence 
regarding variance—which is what standard deviation 
expresses—Howell has provided such evidence to the Court in 
the form of a P value. 




force has been drained from the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-
section requirement. 
II. 
 Accepting the reliability of his statistical evidence, 
Howell, in my view, has satisfied both the second and third 
prongs of the test espoused by the Supreme Court in Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.S. at 364;10 namely, he has demonstrated that 
(A) “the representation” of black persons “in venires from 
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation 
to the number of such persons in the community” and (B) “this 
underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion of this 
group in the jury-selection process.” 
A. 
 Howell has demonstrated that black persons in 
Allegheny County were underrepresented on venires by 
approximately 54.49% in the early 2000s.  This rate of 
underrepresentation simply cannot be “fair and reasonable” 
under Duren. 
 “[N]either Duren nor any other decision of th[e 
Supreme] Court specifies the method or test courts must use to 
measure the representation of distinctive groups in jury pools.”  
                                              
10  As the majority recognizes, Howell undoubtedly 
has satisfied Duren’s first prong, which requires him to 
demonstrate that black persons are “a ‘distinctive’ group in the 
community.”  Duren, 439 U.S. at 364; see also Ramseur v. 
Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding 
that black persons are “unquestionably a constitutionally 




Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 329 (2010).  Our Court 
previously has utilized “absolute disparity” and “comparative 
disparity” to analyze the merits of fair-cross-section claims.  
Weaver, 267 F.3d at 241 & n.11.  “Absolute disparity” is the 
“difference between [(x)] the percentage of a certain 
population group eligible for jury duty and [(y)] the percentage 
of that group who actually appear in the venire.”  Ramseur v. 
Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).  
“Comparative disparity is calculated by dividing [(x)] the 
absolute disparity by [(y)] the population figure for a 
population group.”  Id.  Although “both methods have been 
criticized,” Weaver, 267 F.3d at 242, we have held that “figures 
from both methods inform the degree of underrepresentation,” 
and we “examine and consider the results of both in order to 
obtain the most accurate picture possible,” id. at 243. 
 The comparative disparity in this case is 54.49%, while 
the absolute disparity in this case is 5.83%.  The 
Commonwealth argues that analysis of the absolute disparity 
is the “starting place” when considering a fair-cross-section 
challenge and that, given the absolute-disparity figure in this 
case, it also should be the ending place for Howell’s fair-cross-
section claim.  Appellee’s Br. 19.  Relying on dicta in our 
decision in Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, the 
Commonwealth argues that “[a]bsolute disparities between 
2.0% and 11.5% have not constituted substantial 
underrepresentation” and that, “[t]herefore, under applicable 
precedent, an [a]bsolute [d]isparity of 5.83% is statistically 
insufficient to demonstrate a prima facie showing of a Sixth 
Amendment violation.” Appellee’s Br. 20 (emphasis omitted).  
This argument not only disregards our Court’s observation that 
“[o]ur precedent does not dictate that one method of statistical 




at 241, but also misapprehends what the absolute-disparity 
figure captures.  Viewed in isolation, an absolute-disparity 
figure lacks any meaning because the same absolute-disparity 
figure can imply drastically different levels of 
underrepresentation in two distinct populations. 
For example, if, as the Commonwealth seems to 
suggest, an absolute disparity of over 11.5% is required for a 
litigant to state a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim, 
Howell would never be able to state a fair-cross-section claim; 
the black jury-service-eligible population of Allegheny County 
is 10.7%, and thus the maximum absolute disparity in Howell’s 
case is 10.7%, which assumes the complete exclusion of black 
persons from service on venires (i.e., a comparative disparity 
of 100%).  By contrast, in Philadelphia County, for example, 
which has a black population of approximately 43.4%, an 
absolute disparity of 11.5% would equate to 
underrepresentation of black persons on venires at a rate (and 
a comparative disparity) of 26.5%, raising much fewer 
constitutional concerns.  It approaches absurdity to argue that 
the entire black population of Allegheny County could be 
excluded from serving on venires without violating the 
Constitution simply because a single metric—absolute 
disparity—is not high enough, without reference to any other 
factors. 
But the majority and concurring opinions adopt 
precisely that argument.  The majority holds that “an absolute 
disparity below 10% generally will not reflect unfair and 
unreasonable representation.”  The concurrence takes this line 
of argument even further, framing an absolute disparity of 10% 
as a “threshold” matter and implying that this Court has set the 




the absolute disparity in a given case can only be as high as the 
percentage of the population that a distinctive group 
constitutes.  If a litigant must present evidence of an absolute 
disparity of 10% (or, for the concurrence, 11.5%) as a 
“threshold” matter to state a fair-cross-section claim, then 
litigants, as a matter of law, cannot state fair-cross-section 
claims if the distinctive group that they allege was 
systematically excluded from serving on venires constitutes 
less than 10% (or 11.5%) of the population because, in such a 
case, even complete exclusion of such a group would not result 
in an absolute disparity of 10% (or 11.5%).  In essence, the 
majority and concurring opinions hold that the Sixth 
Amendment provides no remedy for complete, systematic 
exclusion of distinctive groups in the community if those 
groups constitute less than 10% (or 11.5%) of the population. 
 Both the majority and concurring opinions also 
misunderstand the interaction between absolute disparity and 
comparative disparity.  Analyzing the absolute disparity and 
comparative disparity in a case is not an either-or proposition:  
“figures from both methods inform the degree of 
underrepresentation.”  Id. at 243 (emphasis added).  We look 
at both figures because comparative disparity is a dependent 
variable—in fact, absolute disparity is the numerator in the 
formula used to calculate comparative disparity.  In other 
words, we cannot even calculate the comparative disparity in a 
case without knowing the absolute disparity.  Thus, the 
comparative disparity in a case, by necessity, implies a precise 
absolute disparity—every comparative disparity has a 
corresponding absolute disparity, and vice versa. 
If, as the majority and concurring opinions hold, a 




(or 11.5%) as a “threshold” matter to state a fair-cross-section 
claim, the opinions’ analyses of the comparative disparity in 
Howell’s case are merely perfunctory.  As illustrated in the 
Appendix to this opinion, Howell would have to produce 
evidence of a comparative disparity of 93.46% or higher to 
satisfy a 10% absolute-disparity “threshold,” and Howell could 
never satisfy a 11.5% absolute disparity “threshold” because 
he would have to produce evidence of a comparative disparity 
in excess of 100%, which is impossible.  If—as the majority 
and concurring opinions, by necessity, hold—the comparative 
disparity in Howell’s case must exceed these figures because 
absolute disparity is a “threshold” matter, any analysis in the 
majority and concurring opinions with respect to the 
sufficiency of Howell’s comparative disparity figure of 
54.49% necessarily must be composed of empty words. 
In my view, Howell’s statistics are sufficient to state a 
fair-cross-section claim.  When analyzing this case, my reading 
of the case law compels me to start with the comparative 
disparity of 54.49%.  This figure—which implies that over half 
of Allegheny County’s black jury-service-eligible population 
was excluded from serving on venires—should trouble 
everyone.  Although this figure is well above the 40% figure 
that we called “borderline” in Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1232, our 
analysis cannot stop there because we have recognized that 
comparative disparity may overstate the degree of 
underrepresentation in cases “where a small population is 
subjected to scrutiny,” Weaver, 267 F.3d at 242. 
We must, then, look at the size of the population at 
issue—and, consequently, at  the absolute disparity—to place 
the troubling 54.49% comparative disparity into context and 




violation.  See id. (“[T]he significance of the [comparative-
disparity] figure is directly proportional to the size of the group 
relative to the general population . . . .”).  For example, in 
Weaver, we noted that comparative disparities of 40.01% with 
respect to black persons and 72.98% with respect to Latino 
persons were “quite high,” but because the black and Latino 
jury-service-eligible populations constituted merely 3.07% and 
0.97% of the total jury-service-eligible population, 
respectively, we held that these figures did not rise to an 
unconstitutional level of underrepresentation.  Id. at 238, 243.  
In essence, because the populations at issue in Weaver were so 
small—resulting in absolute disparities of 1.23% for black 
persons and 0.71% for Latino persons—the net impact of the 
underrepresentation of these racial groups on venires was 
minimal, and therefore their degree of representation on 
venires was “fair and reasonable” under the Sixth Amendment.  
See id. at 243. 
Here, we are not confronted with a small population 
group as in Weaver; rather, we are confronted with a group that 
constitutes over one-tenth—10.7%—of the relevant jury-
service-eligible population.  Given the significant size of that 
group—black persons—as a proportion of the total jury-
service-eligible population, underrepresentation of black 
persons at a rate of 54.49% cannot be “fair and reasonable” 
under Duren; the black jury-service-eligible population of 
Allegheny County is large enough such that the troubling 
comparative disparity of 54.49% is probative of a Sixth 
Amendment violation.  See id. at 242 (“[C]omparative 
disparity . . . is most useful when dealing with a group that 
comprises a large percentage of the population.”).  The black 
jury-service-eligible population, however, is nonetheless small 




“understates the systematic representative deficiencies.”  Id. 
(quoting United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th 
Cir. 1998)).  As discussed above, the absolute disparity in this 
case has an absolute maximum limit of 10.7%, which assumes 
complete exclusion of black persons from service on venires 
and a comparative disparity of 100%; thus, as illustrated by the 
Appendix, demanding a higher absolute disparity in this case 
would require a comparative disparity that would quickly 
approach 100% and complete exclusion.  Therefore, 
underrepresentation of black persons on juries at a rate of 
54.49% under these particular circumstances is sufficient to 
establish that such underrepresentation violates the Sixth 
Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement.11  Cf. Garcia-
                                              
11 The unconstitutional nature of the 
underrepresentation of black persons on venires in Allegheny 
County comes into stark relief when one considers it in the 
broader context of the ultimate goal of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding racial discrimination in jury selection.  
As a result of Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538, and its 
progeny (including Duren), the Supreme Court prohibits the 
state from discriminating on the basis of, among other things, 
race when compiling jury pools and assembling venires from 
which petit juries are drawn.  See id. (“[J]ury wheels, pools of 
names, or venires from which juries are drawn must not 
systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community 
and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.”).  As 
a result of Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880), 
and its progeny (including Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986)), the Supreme Court prohibits the state from 
discriminating on the basis of race when selecting petit juries 
from those venires.  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (“The Equal 




                                              
not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on 
account of race.” (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305)).  Although 
“a defendant has no right to a ‘petit jury composed in whole or 
in part of persons of his own race,’” id. at 85 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305), the upshot of Taylor and 
Strauder and their progeny is that a defendant’s petit jury 
should be reasonably representative of the racial demographics 
of her community because the empanelment of the petit jury 
should be the result of a process free from racial 
discrimination:  venires cannot be assembled in a racially 
discriminatory way, and the state cannot select petit juries in a 
racially discriminatory way, and thus the resulting petit juries 
should be reasonably representative of the racial demographics 
of the community. 
If black persons were represented on venires in 
Allegheny County in the early 2000s in equal proportion to 
their representation in the jury-service-eligible population as a 
whole (10.7%), assuming that petit juries were empaneled 
properly in a race-neutral manner, we would expect every 
single criminal petit jury in Allegheny County to have had at 
least one black juror.  Specifically, we would expect each 
criminal petit jury of twelve to have, on average, 1.3 black 
jurors (10.7% of 12).  In reality, utilizing Howell’s statistics 
and assuming again that petit juries were empaneled properly 
in a race-neutral manner, we expect that approximately 42% of 
criminal petit juries in Allegheny County had zero black 
jurors—like the jury that convicted Howell.  Specifically, we 
expect that each criminal petit jury of twelve had, on average, 
0.58 black jurors (4.87% of 12).  The Constitution simply 
cannot tolerate such a wide disparity that results solely from 




Dorantes v. Warren, 801 F.3d 584, 600 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
absolute disparity for African-Americans of 3.45% and 
corresponding 42% comparative disparity are sufficient to 
satisfy the Duren second prong.”). 
B. 
 Finally, Howell has satisfied the third prong of the test 
in Duren:  he has produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that the underrepresentation of black persons on venires “is due 
to the systematic exclusion of this group in the jury-selection 
process.”  439 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added). 
 Under Duren, Howell need only demonstrate that the 
underrepresentation of black persons is “‘systematic’—that is, 
inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized.”  Id. 
at 366.  In other words, Howell simply must prove that the 
underrepresentation of black persons was “due to the system by 
which juries were selected.”  Id. at 367.  The term “systematic 
exclusion,” however, does not connote “intentional 
discrimination”:  “intentional discrimination need not . . . be 
shown to prove a Sixth Amendment fair cross  section claim.”  
Weaver, 267 F.3d at 244 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26 
(contrasting equal-protection challenges, which require 
evidence of discriminatory intent, with Sixth Amendment fair-
cross-section challenges, which require proof of only 
“systematic disproportion itself”)).  “Under Duren, ‘systematic 
exclusion’ can be shown by a large discrepancy repeated over 
time such that the system must be said to bring about the 
underrepresentation.”  Id.  For example, the Supreme Court 
held in Duren that the petitioner’s statistical evidence, which 
“demonstrate[ed] that a large discrepancy occurred not just 




month study period, “manifestly indicate[d] that the cause of 
the underrepresentation was systematic.”  439 U.S. at 367. 
 The majority holds that Howell cannot demonstrate that 
the underrepresentation of black persons was “systematic” for 
three reasons:  (1) the process by which venires were 
assembled was “facially neutral,” insofar as veniremembers 
were drawn from voter-registration lists and motor-vehicle 
records; (2) the six-month study of venires upon which Howell 
relies is not of a sufficient duration to support a finding of 
“systematic exclusion”; and (3) Allegheny County was 
engaged in “on-going efforts to improve the representativeness 
of jury lists,” which, according the majority, makes “it less 
likely that the data reflects that underrepresentation is due to a 
systematic exclusion in the jury process.” 
 I disagree with the premises of each of these points.  
First, by giving weight to the fact that venires are assembled 
from “facially neutral” sources, it appears that the majority is 
requiring Howell to produce evidence of racially 
discriminatory intent, which he is not required to produce 
under Duren to state a Sixth Amendment claim.  See id. at 368 
n.26; accord Weaver, 267 F.3d 244.  According to the 
concurring opinion, because Allegheny County assembled its 
venires from two facially neutral sources—voter-registration 
lists and motor-vehicle records—Allegheny County’s “system 
[went] above and beyond what is constitutionally required.”  
What the concurring opinion fails to grasp is that the use of 
race-neutral sources in assembling venires is only what the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires:  the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids the government from intentionally discriminating on 
the basis of race in assembling venires or petit juries.  See 




requires that “representation of [a distinctive] group in venires 
from which juries are selected [must be] fair and reasonable in 
relation to the number of such persons in the community.”  
Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 
522, 538 (1975)).  “[I]ntentional discrimination need not be 
shown to prove a Sixth Amendment fair[-]cross[-]section 
claim,” and thus the fact that Allegheny County assembled its 
venires from race-neutral sources is immaterial to Howell’s 
Sixth Amendment claim.  Weaver, 267 F.3d at 244.  The 
majority and concurring opinions thus disregard our 
observation in Weaver that “if the use of voter registration 
lists”—a facially neutral source—“over time did have the 
effect of sizeably underrepresenting a particular class or group 
of the jury venire, then under some circumstances, ‘this could 
constitute a violation of a defendant’s fair-cross-section rights 
under the [S]ixth [A]mendment.’”  Id. at 244–45 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373, 1378 
n.4 (11th Cir. 1982)).  This is not, as the concurring opinion 
phrases it, a “theoretical possibility”:  Howell’s very statistics 
establish that the use of voter-registration lists and motor-
vehicle records resulted in the underrepresentation of black 
persons on venires in Allegheny County at a rate of 54.49%, 
even though Allegheny County used race-neutral sources to 
assemble its venires. 
 Second, taken together with other evidence, the six-
month duration of the study upon which Howell relies is 
sufficient to demonstrate that the underrepresentation of black 
persons was “systematic.”  The six-month duration of the study 
in this case is sufficiently similar to the eight-month duration 
of the study in Duren, which, standing alone, “manifestly 
indicate[d] that the cause of the underrepresentation was 




stronger set of facts, from which the Supreme Court could even 
“establish[] when in the selection process the systematic 
exclusion took place,” but nowhere in Duren does the Supreme 
Court hold that a litigant needs such a strong set of facts to 
prevail on a fair-cross-section claim; rather, the core holding 
of Duren in this regard is that a litigant must prove merely that 
the “cause of the underrepresentation was systematic—that is, 
inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized”—and 
that a study with an eight-month duration “manifestly 
indicates” such a “systematic” cause.  Id.  Further, by relying 
on Ramseur for the proposition that a study with a duration of 
two years was not sufficient to demonstrate systematic 
underrepresentation, the majority disregards the fact that 
Ramseur is in direct conflict with Supreme Court precedent in 
Duren on this point, and Ramseur should not be considered 
good law in this regard.  Indeed, our Court previously has noted 
that we undertook a flawed analytical approach in Ramseur 
with respect to the second and third prongs of Duren.  See 
Weaver, 267 F.3d at 241 (“In our brief discussion of Ramseur’s 
Sixth Amendment claim, we appear to have combined the 
second and the third prongs of Duren . . . .”). 
 Third, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the evidence 
in this case that Allegheny County took steps to increase racial 
diversity on venires tends to suggest that the 
underrepresentation of black persons was systematic, not the 
opposite.  The Jury Coordinator of the Allegheny County Court 
Administrator’s Office testified that “one of the parts of [his] 
mission ha[d] been to address concerns about the numbers of 
discrete races and colors . . . of people that [we]re represent[ed 
o]n our jury panels.”  App. 137.  The Jury Coordinator testified 
that “the most important” of his efforts to “address those 




mailed to prospective jurors as part of the process of selecting 
veniremembers.  Id.  This amounts to an admission by 
Allegheny County that it knew that certain racial groups were 
underrepresented on venires and that the cause of the 
underrepresentation was the system by which veniremembers 
were selected because Allegheny County attempted to address 
the problem—and, indeed, eventually ameliorated the 
problem—by altering the system.  This is not, as the majority 
asserts, evidence that undermines Howell’s case; this is 
evidence in Howell’s favor. 
 Therefore, Howell has satisfied the third prong of the 
test espoused in Duren.  The six-month study upon which he 
relies is sufficiently similar in duration to the eight-month 
study in Duren such that the duration of the study indicates that 
the system of selecting potential jurors caused the 
underrepresentation, and the evidence with respect to 
Allegheny County’s attempts to alter the system to increase 
racial diversity suggest that Allegheny County itself believed 
the problem of underrepresentation was systematic. 
III. 
While I find that Howell’s statistics are reliable and help 
establish a prima facie violation of his Sixth Amendment fair-
cross-section rights,  the focus on and discussion of statistics 
and statistical concepts in this case—statistical reliability, the 
difference between standard deviation and standard error, the 
import of absolute disparity versus comparative disparity—
obscures what is a relatively straightforward question:  Did the 
process of selecting potential jurors result in the 
underrepresentation of black persons on venires in Allegheny 
County to a degree that is constitutionally unacceptable?  In 




has demonstrated that black persons were underrepresented on 
venires to a troubling degree and that the underrepresentation 
was caused by the system of selecting prospective jurors, in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section 
requirement. 
There is evidence in the record to suggest that the court 
administrators in Allegheny County eventually implemented 
policies that remedied the underrepresentation of black persons 
on venires.  The underrepresentation of black persons on 
venires, however, had not been remedied at the time of 
Howell’s trial, and, because Howell established that black 
persons were underrepresented on venires at an alarming rate, 
his Sixth Amendment right to have his petit jury drawn from a 
fair cross-section of the community was violated. 
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent.  
Because Howell has established a prima facie fair-cross-
section violation, I would remand to the District Court to 
determine whether the Commonwealth can “justify[] this 
infringement by showing [that] attainment of a fair cross[-] 
section [was] incompatible with a significant state interest.”  






Illustrative Absolute and Comparative 
Disparity Figures for Black Persons Serving 
on Venires in Allegheny County in the Early 2000s 
 
(with Increases/Decreases in Venire Representation of 0.2%) 











10.7% 10.7% 0.0% 0.00% 
10.7% 10.5% 0.2% 1.87% 
10.7% 10.3% 0.4% 3.74% 
10.7% 10.1% 0.6% 5.61% 
10.7% 9.9% 0.8% 7.48% 
10.7% 9.7% 1.0% 9.35% 
10.7% 9.5% 1.2% 11.21% 
10.7% 9.3% 1.4% 13.08% 
10.7% 9.1% 1.6% 14.95% 
10.7% 8.9% 1.8% 16.82% 
10.7% 8.7% 2.0% 18.69% 
10.7% 8.5% 2.2% 20.56% 
10.7% 8.3% 2.4% 22.43% 
10.7% 8.1% 2.6% 24.30% 
10.7% 7.9% 2.8% 26.17% 













10.7% 7.5% 3.2% 29.91% 
10.7% 7.3% 3.4% 31.78% 
10.7% 7.1% 3.6% 33.64% 
10.7% 6.9% 3.8% 35.51% 
10.7% 6.7% 4.0% 37.38% 
10.7% 6.5% 4.2% 39.25% 
10.7% 6.3% 4.4% 41.12% 
10.7% 6.1% 4.6% 42.99% 
10.7% 5.9% 4.8% 44.86% 
10.7% 5.7% 5.0% 46.73% 
10.7% 5.5% 5.2% 48.60% 
10.7% 5.3% 5.4% 50.47% 
10.7% 5.1% 5.6% 52.34% 
10.7% 4.9% 5.8% 54.21% 
10.7% 4.87% 5.83% 54.49% 
10.7% 4.7% 6.0% 56.07% 
10.7% 4.5% 6.2% 57.94% 
10.7% 4.3% 6.4% 59.81% 
10.7% 4.1% 6.6% 61.68% 
10.7% 3.9% 6.8% 63.55% 
10.7% 3.7% 7.0% 65.42% 
10.7% 3.5% 7.2% 67.29% 
10.7% 3.3% 7.4% 69.16% 













10.7% 2.9% 7.8% 72.90% 
10.7% 2.7% 8.0% 74.77% 
10.7% 2.5% 8.2% 76.64% 
10.7% 2.3% 8.4% 78.50% 
10.7% 2.1% 8.6% 80.37% 
10.7% 1.9% 8.8% 82.24% 
10.7% 1.7% 9.0% 84.11% 
10.7% 1.5% 9.2% 85.98% 
10.7% 1.3% 9.4% 87.85% 
10.7% 1.1% 9.6% 89.72% 
10.7% 0.9% 9.8% 91.59% 
10.7% 0.7% 10.0% 93.46% 
10.7% 0.5% 10.2% 95.33% 
10.7% 0.3% 10.4% 97.20% 
10.7% 0.1% 10.6% 99.07% 
10.7% 0.0% 10.7% 100.00% 
 
 
